PORTARIA REGULATÓRIA Nº 54, DE 30 DE JULHO DE 2026

PORTARIA REGULATÓRIA Nº 54, DE 30 DE JULHO DE 2026 A SUPERINTENDENTE DE AERONAVEGABILIDADE SUBSTITUTA, no uso das atribuições que lhe conferem o art. 35 do Regimento Interno, aprovado pela Resolução nº 381, de 14 de junho de 2016, e considerando o que consta do processo nº 00066.004955/2025-38, resolve: Art. 1º Estabelecer, nos termos do Anexo desta Portaria, os objetivos de segurança operacional a serem considerados na certificação de tipo de aeronaves com capacidade de decolagem e pouso vertical (Vertical Takeoff and Landing Capable Aircraft - VCA). § 1º O requerente de um certificado de tipo de VCA, para demonstrar cumprimento com critério de aeronavegabilidade relacionado ao escopo desta Portaria Regulatória, poderá: I - adotar os meios de cumprimento e procedimentos especificados nesta Portaria Regulatória; ou II - apresentar meio de cumprimento ou procedimento alternativo devidamente justificado, exigindo-se, nesse caso, a análise e concordância expressa da Gerência de Certificação de Projeto de Produto Aeronáutico - GCPP. § 2º O meio de cumprimento ou procedimento alternativo mencionado no § 1º deste artigo deve garantir nível de segurança igual ou superior ao estabelecido pelo critério de aeronavegabilidade aplicável ou concretizar o objetivo do procedimento normalizado nesta Portaria Regulatória. Art. 2º Esta Portaria Regulatória entra em vigor na data de sua publicação. LUCIANA FERREIRA VIEIRA ANEXO OBJETIVOS DE SEGURANÇA PARA AERONAVES COM CAPACIDADE DE DECOLAGEM E POUSO VERTICAL SAFETY OBJECTIVES FOR VERTICAL TAKEOFF AND LANDING CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (VCA) INTRODUCTION This ANAC policy establishes the safety objectives for VTOL Capable Aircraft (VCA), including electric propulsion vertical takeoff and landing aircraft (eVTOL). BACKGROUND Certification Levels The concept of safety continuum provides a balanced approach between the risk and safety benefits for certification of civil aircraft depending on size, mission, capability, and other aspects. For VTOL Capable Aircraft (VCA), ANAC adopts the VCA Certification Levels according to Table 1. Table 1 - VCA Certification Levels Maximum Passenger Seating Configuration and Maximum Gross Weight VCA Certification Level 0-1 Passengers & £ 5,670 kg (12,500 lbs.) 1 2-6 Passengers & £ 5,670 kg (12,500 lbs.) 2 7-9 Passengers & £ 5,670 kg (12,500 lbs.) 3 These certification levels are based on the airplane certification levels defined in requirement §23.2005 of RBAC 23 amdt. 64 (equivalent to FAA 14CFR §23.2005 amdt. 64, and EASA CS-23 amdt. 5), with the exception that ANAC is currently limiting the certification levels for VCA to a maximum gross weight of 5,670kg (12,500 lbs.) or less, which is compatible with the definition of small aircraft in accordance with RBAC 01. Significantly heavier VCA will require the evaluation of additional and specific characteristics than those currently taken into consideration by ANAC for existing VCA designs. Reason for This Policy In carrying out a system safety assessment as required for the certification of civil aircraft, the applicant must show that there is a logical and acceptable inverse relationship between the average probability and the severity of failure conditions. Safety objectives are then established at means of compliance level as part of the pass/fail criteria for successful compliance determination. In particular, the safety objectives provide the relationship between the aircraft certification level, the severity of its failure conditions, and the required average probabilities and Functional Development Assurance Levels (FDALs). Safety objectives for conventional aircraft such as airplanes and helicopters are defined in well-established and harmonized means of compliance that are issued (or recognized) by each certification authority. VCA, on the other hand, are heavier-than-air aircraft capable of vertical takeoff, vertical landing, and low speed flight that depends principally on engine-driven lift devices or engine thrust for lift during these flight regimes and on nonrotating airfoil(s) for lift during horizontal flight. [1] An electric propulsion, vertical takeoff and landing aircraft (eVTOL) is one type of VCA that typically integrates distributed electric propulsion and flight controls. Due to their novelty, there's currently no harmonized guidance material defining safety objectives for VCA. This policy is then needed to establish ANAC's safety objectives for VTOL Capable Aircraft. It applies to ANAC's Type Certification of VCA designs, including TC validation of foreign designs. ANAC's Development of Safety Objectives for VTOL Capable Aircraft The ANAC performed its assessment of safety objectives for VCA leveraging from existing guidance material related to the concept of safety continuum, dialogue with the industry and certification authorities, and considering key characteristics of these new designs and intended operation. In doing so, published guidance material for aircraft with similar passenger capacity, payload, design weights and operations were compared for the application of the safety continuum concept to different types of vehicles, including conventional airplanes and helicopters, powered-lift aircraft including eVTOLs, and Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS). Serious/fatal accident statistics pertinent to RBAC/14 CFR Part 135 operations were assessed as the safety objectives associated with each catastrophic failure condition is related to these statistics by assuming a contribution of system-related design hazards and a given number of failure conditions in the design. This assessment is consistent with analyses to determine safety objectives presented in FAA AC 25.1309-1B [2] and AC 23.1309-1E [3] . New VCA designs, especially eVTOLs, have specific characteristics such as integrated full-fly-by-wire controls and distributed electric propulsion, indirect piloting and envelope protections, typically higher weight and dimensions, and others that differ them from conventional aircraft. These characteristics, as well as their intended operation (e.g. urban air mobility for compensation or hire), were evaluated for their potential effect in defining the applicable safety objectives (alleviating or intensifying factors). Finally, a dedicated analysis was performed to establish appropriate development assurance levels to limit the likelihood of development errors in such designs. ANAC submitted its studies on this subject to sectorial consultation and received comments from the industry, certification authorities, and individuals. These comments were dispositioned and considered by ANAC to improve the assessment, which resulted in this policy. The sectorial consultation and related studies primarily addressed VCA Certification Level 2. Nevertheless, the findings enabled ANAC to define safety objectives for Certification Levels 1 and 3 as well, considering a Safety Continuum methodology. POLICY The safety objectives are part of the means of compliance for system safety requirements identified in the certification basis of the design, in particular RBAC §23.2510 and its equivalent for VTOL Capable Aircraft (VCA). They define quantitative and qualitative criteria that are accepted as aids to engineering judgment in a system safety assessment. These objectives are applicable to all the aircraft systems and their combinations. They establish availability and integrity safety constraints that should be achieved at the aircraft, system and item levels. As such, the safety objectives are one of the key aspects for establishing the overall level of safety of the design, along with other safety-related requirements included in the certification basis. The Table 2 provides quantitative probabilities and FDALs as safety objectives for each Failure Condition classification for VCA depending on Certification Level. Table 2 - Relationship among severity of failure conditions, probabilities, and development assurance levels for VCA Failure Condition Classification No Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic Effect on aircraft No effect on operational capabilities or safety Slight reduction in functional capabilities or safety margins Significant reduction in functional capabilities or safety margins Large reduction in functional capabilities or safety margins Loss of aircraft Effect on flight crew No effect on flight crew Slight increase in workload that involves crew actions well within crew capabilities such as routine flight plan changes Physical discomfort or a significant increase in workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency Physical distress or excessive workload impairs ability to perform tasks accurately or completely Fatalities or incapacitation Effect on occupants excluding flight crew Inconvenience Physical discomfort Physical distress, possibly including injuries Serious injuries or a fatal injury to a single passenger or cabin crew member Multiple Fatalities Qualitative Probability No Probability Requirement Probable Remote Extremely Remote Extremely Improbable VCA Certification Level 1 No probability or FDAL requirement <10 -3 FDAL D <10 -5 FDAL C <10 -6 FDAL C <10 -7 FDAL B VCA Certification Level 2 No probability or FDAL requirement <10 -3 FDAL D <10 -5 FDAL C <10 -7 FDAL C <10 -8 FDAL B VCA Certification Level 3 No probability or FDAL requirement <10 -3 FDAL D <10 -5 FDAL C <10 -7 FDAL B <10 -9 FDAL A Note 1: Numerical values indicate an order of probability per flight hour of failure range and are provided here as a reference. FDAL and IDAL assignment methodology should follow a consistent top-down approach methodology (e.g. ARP4754B, §5.2). A qualitative analysis is acceptable to justify minor failure conditions. Note 2: No single failure will result in a Catastrophic Failure Condition. ____________________________ [1] Ref.: FAA 14CFR §1.1. [2] Ref.: FAA AC 25.1309-1B Appendix A [3] Ref.: FAA AC 23.1309-1E Section 15