Circular

161. No controle do Estado sobre a economia chinesa, as State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) desempenham um papel fundamental. Esse papel é, inclusive, claramente estabelecido na Constituição chinesa, conforme ressaltado no Documento de Trabalho Europeu: The general legal framework in which SOEs operate is set by Article 7 of the Constitution which stipulates that: "the State-owned economy, namely, the socialist economy under ownership by the whole people, is the leading force in the national economy. The State ensures the consolidation and growth of the State-owned economy." The Constitution therefore ascribes a particular role to the state-owned sector, i.e. to be the leading force of the economy as opposed to e.g. the principle of ownership neutrality in the EU Treaties [...]. 162. Mais relevante ainda, não apenas as empresas são estatais em termos de controle acionário, mas, obviamente, em termos de administração e atuação: Given the strategic importance the Chinese authorities attach to the state-owned sector, the government has great interest in maintaining effective control over the conduct of SOEs. That control is essentially exercised through two channels: first, the Chinese government reshapes the corporate structure of the sector; and second, it has control over the management and personnel of individual SOEs. 163. Esse controle está diretamente relacionado à atuação do Partido Comunista, como já destacado anteriormente, na administração das SOEs: In sum, the recent policy and regulatory developments result in a situation in which the SOEs remain the backbone of the Chinese economy and in which the CCP can exercise control over the large state-owned sector. This control is not only exercised by virtue of the State shareholding or the government regulatory power but, crucially, also through direct involvement in the day-to-day management of the CCP's organisation within individual SOEs. The legal framework as described above enables the CCP bodies established inside SOEs to wield significant influence including over business decisions of individual companies. This in turn further increases the importance and usefulness of SOEs as vehicles for the implementation of the Party's economic objectives [...]. 164. A importância das SOEs na economia chinesa é patente: In China, SOEs represent an important and comparatively large portion of the national economy [...]. They will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. According to the relevant laws and policy documents, the state-owned economy is explicitly considered as a pillar of the Chinese socialist market economy. The IMF estimated in 2021 that Chinese SOEs accounted for some 39% of total industrial corporate assets and for about the same portion of corporate debt [...]. These figures were likely underestimated, not least because they did not include JVs that SOEs held together with private companies. SOEs are increasing their presence in the service economy, and it remains constantly high in utilities, the finance sector, telecommunication, the transport industry and a broad range of manufacturing industries including steel and chemicals. The existing legal framework is based on the principles of the socialist market economy in which the development and the consolidation of the state-owned economy feature among the central principles. The particular role of SOEs ('the leading force in the national economy') is anchored in the Constitution and the relevant constitutional principles are reiterated and elaborated in both primary and secondary legislation. It falls upon the State to ensure the consolidation and growth of the state-owned economy [...]. Consequently, the applicable laws confer upon the government significant powers which allow it to effectively control SOEs, be it via dedicated supervision bodies - SASAC and local SASACs, or by directly participating in the operational decision-making of SOEs [...]. 165. Mais ainda, o controle do Partido Comunista Chinês não se limita às SOEs, mas ocorrem, também, no setor privado existente: Leaders of the private firms are not part of the cadre system. However, this does not mean that private companies would find themselves outside the Party's sphere of influence - or even shielded from their direct interventions. As in the case of the state-owned sector, the recent dynamics of the relations between the Party and the privately owned companies is characterised by a mix of relatively settled principles on the role of the private economy within the Chinese economic system [...] and by new policy and regulatory moves towards stronger leverage of the Party over the private sector [nota de rodapé omitida]. The creation of party organisations is reconfirmed in relevant legislation such as in Article 19 of the Company Law [nota de rodapé omitida]: In a company, an organisation of the Communist Party of China shall be established to carry out the activities of the party in accordance with the Constitution of the Communist Party of China. The company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. 166. Como destaca o Documento de Trabalho Europeu, a atuação do Partido Comunista nas empresas privadas ocorre não apenas de cima para baixo em termos de estrutura, mas, também, de baixo para cima: Interestingly, the Guidelines not only lay claim to the CCP leadership over the private sector in the standard top-down regulatory approach, but they also seek to increase the Party's presence in private enterprises in a bottom-up manner by means of recruiting or at least training selected individuals from private companies into the CCP: We must [...] actively and properly work to recruit Party members from among outstanding private-sector representatives and promptly bring into the Party those with good political qualities and high public approval who meet Party membership criteria. If there is no Party branch in the organisation where they work, the personnel department of the Party committee (leading Party group) above county level can liaise with them and organise their training directly [nota de rodapé omitida]. 167. Assim, portanto, como resume o documento da Comissão Europeia, The CCP is the only governing party in China with its leadership role assigned by the Constitution. This leadership role covers all aspects of the State (such as armed forces or education) including - importantly for the purposes of this Report - the government apparatus [...] and personnel [...]. The recent years have seen a growing integration between the State and the Party, making the structures of the Party and those of the State functionally indistinguishable. This integration entailed not only government reforms geared towards boosting the CCP's control over the State administration [...], but also an increasing tendency of the Party to inject itself directly into the corporate structures and the managerial decision-making of individual business operators, state-owned [,,,] and private [...] alike. Consequently, the CCP is in position to control the country's economy both by using the State institutions, as well as through other - more direct and informal - channels, in particular Party structures within enterprises. 168. Dentro desse contexto de controle estatal, a análise do sistema financeiro na China atesta, da mesma forma, que não se trata de um mercado regido por regras de mercado. Como resume o Documento de Trabalho Europeu: Despite changes throughout the past decades, the current Chinese financial system is still characterized by two features: (1) a strong presence of state-owned banks and (2) a widespread influence of the State which imposes on the financial system a number of policy objectives, in particular the implementation of the sophisticated economic planning system. Moreover, the recent/ongoing changes in the organisational set-up of the regulatory bodies confirm and reinforce the subordination of these bodies to the CCP [...]. The Chinese financial system remains centred around banking, with RMB-denominated bank loans accounting for the largest portion of aggregate financing to the real economy in the country [...]. The most important categories of banks in China are the following: large state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and policy banks. The rest is mainly accounted for by smaller rural or city commercial banks which are mostly owned by local or provincial governments. Foreign-invested banks remain negligible in China's banking sector [...]. The State dominance over the banking sector and the legal framework which encourages lending in line with industrial policies, perpetuates the existence of significant shadow banking sector, given that certain categories of economic operators may face difficulties to raise capital in the current system [...]. The State controls the banks through various channels, in particular through direct and indirect ownership which in turn facilitates its control over the management bodies of the banking institutions [...]. Moreover, irrespective of the degree of State ownership, all important banks host internal CCP organisations. As apparent from relevant legislation, as well as from the AoA of major banks, significant personnel overlaps between the management of the banks and the Party organisations are in place (and indeed required) and the CCP organisations have to be involved in major operational and management issues of the respective banks [...]. As to the export credit insurance market, Sinosure, as the main operator on the market remains fully State-controlled both in terms of ownership as well as stated purpose. Consequently, Sinosure appears to be mainly fulfilling the State's policies with limited regard to commercial considerations when providing insurance. In combination with China not being bound by the OECD-based rules, this results in export credit insurance typically being offered on inappropriately favourable terms to Chinese companies [...]. Last but not least, the number of bankruptcy cases, which is very low for an economy of China's size, points to serious issues with the enforcement of bankruptcy laws, stemming from a number of flaws in these laws, as well as from their inadequate implementation. In particular, the State plays an unduly active role in the bankruptcy proceedings, not least in view of the lack of Chinese judiciary system's independence, as well as given the government authorities' involvement in individual bankruptcy cases, often influencing their outcome. Consequently, the Chinese bankruptcy system continues to operate inadequately, with the slow progress on addressing core issues - such the removal of the implicit guarantees and tightening SOEs budget constraints - being reported [...]. Overall, the functioning of the entire financial system is characterized by high State presence on both borrowing and lending side, as well as by the absence of normal market mechanisms such as effective and transparent bankruptcy and market exit procedures. 169. Já o setor de compras públicas é outro que apresenta distorções nas regras de mercado na China, como reportado no Documento de Trabalho Europeu: In some respects, allocation of contracts under existing rules is not always transparent, done in a competitive way or based on market rules. Preferential treatment of domestic over foreign enterprises is enshrined in the GPL where the 'Buy Chinese' provisions are explicitly set out. Ensuing distortions, as a result of limiting the competitive field, can manifest themselves through higher award prices or a limited range of goods and services on offer. Given the value of procurement contracts in China, the absence of clear competitive market-based rules has a significant distortive effect. 170. Na ação de intervenção do Estado na economia do setor industrial chinês, um instrumento fundamental é controle dos investimentos: The government employs a broad toolkit to advance its industrial policy goals. These tools include laws, regulations and investment approval processes that apply varying treatment and levels of regulatory scrutiny depending on the nature of the investor and the proposed investment. By employing incentives, restrictions and prohibitions related to investment, the Chinese government maintains considerable control over the country's economy and actively seeks to counter market forces or to alter the terrain for (or 'guide') market forces. 171. Mais do que o controle exercido sobre a economia chinesa de forma geral, o Estado chinês adota intervenções em política industrial que afetam a alocação de recursos. Nesse sentido, a análise do Documento de Trabalho Europeu atesta que "Chinese industrial policies are demonstrably interventionist and there is no sign that this should change in the foreseeable future". 172. No controle estatal e partidário do setor industrial chinês, o governo seleciona setores específicos considerados prioritários nos quais o controle e direcionamento do mercado se faz ainda mais presente: For policy reasons, e.g. to achieve technological advancements and other 'major national strategies', such as those mentioned in the previous Section, Chinese authorities often select specific industry sectors as a priority. Those industries are then to be promoted through regulatory and/or financial incentives. Innovation is frequently emphasised as a key driver of growth in this context and the Government seeks to accelerate Chinese manufacturing moving up the value chain, as well as to establish China as a global centre of innovation and technology. 173. Historicamente, como já verificado pela autoridade investigadora em outros processos, o setor siderúrgico é tratado como um dos setores básicos e estratégicos da economia, situação que permanece válida, como atestado no Documento de Trabalho Europeu: The State maintains control over key or otherwise sensitive industry sectors using a range of policy tools. As one aspect of its control, it carefully regulates private investment activity in key sectors - through an array of restrictions, prohibitions and incentives that operate both pre-establishment and post-establishment - to ensure that firms under effective government control, including SOEs, maintain their market dominance. [...] According to SASAC, these "important industries and key sectors" include the following seven industries: (i) military and defence, (ii) power infrastructure, (iii) petroleum and petrochemicals, (iv) telecommunications, (v) coal, (vi) civil aviation and (vii) shipping. In these seven industries and sectors, Chinese policy is to maintain 'absolute control' [nota de rodapé omitida]. Moreover, SASAC has made clear that it is government policy to maintain 'relatively strong control' over the major backbone enterprises of nine additional 'basic and pillar industries', which are (i) equipment manufacturing, (ii) automobiles, (iii) electronic information, (iv) construction, (v) steel, (vi) non-ferrous metals, (vii) chemicals, (viii) survey and design and (ix) science and technology [nota de rodapé omitida]. What is more, SASAC has made clear that Chinese policy is to maintain 'necessary influence' in more general areas and sectors including trade, investment, pharmaceuticals, building materials and agriculture [nota de rodapé omitida] [...]. 174. Nesse sentido, o 14º Plano Quinquenal ainda deixa claro como os setores estratégicos devem ser apoiados pelo Estado: The overall requirement is defined as "guide the rational allocation and effective concentration of key factors of production such as talent, land use, and energy use' and 'funds follow the project, key factors of production follow the project" [nota de rodapé omitida], whereas the modalities of how support shall be provided are specified as follows [nota de rodapé omitida]: Make good use of all levels and types of government funds, venture capital, and government-funded industry investment funds. Innovate modes of government funding support, and strengthen the role of investment in attracting [attention to] major projects in strategic emerging industries. Encourage local governments to set up special funding plans for strategic emerging industries, and guide social capital to set up industry investment funds in a market-oriented way. [...] Encourage financial institutions to innovate and develop financial products and services adapted to the characteristics of strategic emerging industries, increase support for core enterprises in the production chain, optimize financial services for upstream and downstream enterprises in the production chain, and improve internal assessment and risk control mechanisms. Encourage banks to explore the establishment of financial service centers or business units for emerging industries. Promote cooperation between governments, banks, and enterprises. 175. Assim, como atesta o Documento de Trabalho Europeu, embora tenha adotado medidas de liberalização de investimentos domésticos e estrangeiros, "the State still maintains significant control and influence over private investment through industrial policies, laws, regulations and approval processes for investment." Como mencionado no referido documento: In addition to the direct designation of certain industries as priority in order to spur the sectors' development, the State also shapes the industrial landscape by controlling sectoral investment. China maintains three distinctive negative lists for investment [...], among which the Market Access Negative List ('MA Negative List') [nota de rodapé omitida], applicable to both domestic and foreign investors, restricts investment and requires administrative approval with respect to 117 sectors, while the Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access ('FI Negative List') [nota de rodapé omitida], applicable only to foreign investors, prohibits or restricts investment in an additional 31 sectors. Similar lists and approval mechanisms are also commonly used in government procurement [...]. 176. Há, ainda, importantes distorções causadas pela atuação do Estado chinês nos fatores de produção dos setores considerados estratégicos. No caso da propriedade da terra, por exemplo, [e]ven though a comprehensive set of legislation governs the acquisition, transfer and pricing of LUR for commercial purposes, which in principle should ensure impartiality and equal opportunities for different economic players, those rules are often not implemented in practice, as systematically established in the Commission's TDI investigations: a number of buyers (in particular SOEs) received their land for free or participated in tenders with only one participant, obtaining the land use rights at a very low price. There are also significant discrepancies between different regions and individual cases. A number of distortions were established at the level of implementation: the rules on land provision and acquisition in China are often unclear and non-transparent, and the prices are often set by the authorities on the basis of non-market considerations, such as industrial policies. 177. O mesmo ocorre com o setor de energia elétrica. O Documento de Trabalho Europeu destaca que "China is currently the world's largest power producer. Around 50% of the power generation capacity is state-owned as well as the entire transmission grid. 18 SOEs controlled by the central SASAC are active in the energy sector." 178. A despeito de mudanças e reformas adotadas no mercado de energia chinês, "the energy prices in China are still not fully market based, but still controlled by the state to a high degree." Nesse contexto, [o]ne of the most important issues is the way in which prices are differentiated for various industrial users. Price differentiation is a common practice, for instance there are usually different electricity tariffs for customers consuming large quantities, or energy used in off-peak periods is usually cheaper, or the residential and industrial consumers are subject to different rates. However, the price differentiation observed in China appears to favour certain encouraged industries (or even individual enterprises) and discourage others, and the report provides some examples at the provincial level. 179. Além disso, "it is noted that China provided in the past considerable subsidies to coal production, which in turn triggered the construction of coal-fired power plants to an extent leading to serious oversupply of electricity from this source." 180. Assim, como conclui o Documento de Trabalho Europeu, "[g]iven the significant State presence and intervention into energy production, pricing and planning, the overall picture emerging is one where normal market considerations do not prevail on the Chinese market for energy." 181. Da mesma forma, a intervenção estatal chinesa se faz presente no acesso a capital pelas empresas. Como atesta o Documento de Trabalho Europeu, [a]ccess to capital for corporate actors in China is subject to various distortions given the strong State presence and regulatory controls governing the formal financial system. Firstly, the State plays an undue role in allocating capital. This results in a bias toward lending to SOEs and private businesses with close government ties, crowding out other players in the market. The inefficient allocation of capital is particularly evident in the fact that there is a negative correlation between productivity and leverage, with less profitable SOEs bearing a disproportionate share of indebtedness. This has been exacerbated by China's economic response to COVID-19, which leaned heavily on SOEs through credit-fuelled investment. It is clear that the mechanisms at work in the banking system do not follow normal commercial responses [...]. Policy signals provided by the Government concerning strategic sectors also play a role. The Government seeks to direct investment into key projects and industries by, inter alia, offering loan interest subsidies, loan guarantees and other means of reducing capital costs. Moreover, banks and other lenders are encouraged to support these policies by providing loans to companies active in such sectors. This generates further lending bias, which fundamentally distorts China's financial markets [...]. Secondly, the cost of capital is not the result of free market forces. Although China has continued to liberalise its interest rate regime through the LPR, in September 2022 34% of loans were made below the benchmark [...]. 182. Também no que diz respeito ao fornecimento de matérias-primas, há distorção decorrente das políticas intervencionistas do Estado chinês. Como atesta o Documento de Trabalho Europeu, China uses of a broad range of instruments allowing it to significantly influence the prices of raw materials. By artificially increasing or decreasing the level of raw materials supply, or simply by centrally setting the prices, the government can steer the prices upwards or downwards. The dense web of plans - including plans at the national, sectoral, provincial and municipal level - regulates basically every aspect of the Chinese economy and sets specific targets. In accordance with such plans, many key raw materials and other material inputs are to some extent regulated and are the targets of government intervention [...]. Other instruments applied in the plans which allow the Government to influence the supply level as well as the industry in general include, but are not limited to: increasing supply of raw materials by setting detailed minimum production targets, decreasing supply by setting maximum targets, prescriptions over overcapacity e.g. by blocking new investment projects, interventions of the State into the structure of enterprises (mergers and acquisitions to create large enterprises), central management of the geographic distribution of industries and transfers, and various extensive support measures (financial and other). Secondly, the Government can influence prices by introducing different sorts of impediments to export. By limiting the quantities of raw materials exported abroad, the domestic supply is kept artificially high, leading to lower prices, constituting a benefit for the domestic producers of downstream products. [...] Thirdly, the Government has the capacity to set prices of certain goods centrally. Even though the list of centrally set prices has to a great extent been reduced, the government is still intervening in cases where the prices run counter to government policies. Stockpiling is another instrument allowing the State to significantly influence. 183. Por fim, mas não menos relevante, o Estado chinês intervém diretamente no custo da mão-de-obra, distorcendo, também por esse meio, os fatores de produção no mercado daquele país. 184. Como destaca o Documento de Trabalho Europeu, [a]ccording to China's Trade Union Law, Chinese workers have no possibility to freely choose or establish a trade union in which they want to organise themselves, because there is only one legally recognized trade union, the ACFTU. Furthermore, although collective bargaining of wages exists, it is not well developed. The ACFTU has around 300 million members and is present in 6.5 million enterprises. However, the ACFTU is not independent, but rather is closely intertwined with the Party and the State. There is evidence that senior positions in ACFTU are occupied by senior party figures in SOEs or by managers in non-state enterprises. In other words, the union leaders appear to also be high level managers. This hampers their ability to represent workers' interests in full independence. All this can lead to situations where the management or, in the case of SOEs, the government negotiates with itself. There is no official national level right to strike. In fact, this right was removed from the Constitution in 1982. In practice, strikes do happen in China and some local laws recognize some form of right to strike, but there are also a number of reports of labour activists being arrested, detained, imprisoned or made forcible disappeared [...]. 185. Contrariamente ao que ocorreu no 13º Plano Quinquenal, o Estado chinês não publicou um plano específico para o setor siderúrgico no 14º Plano Quinquenal. Entretanto, the development goals for the steel industry have been incorporated into the 14th Raw Materials FYP, which covers several sectors. Emphasising from the outset that the raw material industry is the bedrock of the real economy, the Plan states that it was "formulated in order to implement the [14th FYP] and improve the development quality and profitability of the raw materials industry". Complementing the Plan, MIIT, together with NDRC and MEE, issued, in January 2022, the Steel Industry Development GO [nota de rodapé omitida] which set additional quantitative targets. 186. Para se compreender o setor siderúrgico na China, é fundamental ter em conta que SOEs are the most important players in the Chinese steel market and a considerable part of the steel industrial structure, often receiving important preferential treatment from the State [...]. According to an OECD study [nota de rodapé omitida], a considerable amount of financial support to Chinese SOEs is provided via instruments deemed to be potentially amongst the most market distortive (for example cash grants). 187. No que diz respeito às SOEs, vale lembrar que, de acordo com o artigo 1º do Law on State-Owned Assets of Enterprises: This Law is enacted for the purpose of safeguarding the basic economic system of China, consolidating and expanding the State-owned economic sector, strengthening protection of State-owned assets, giving play to the leading role of the State-owned economic sector in the national economy, and promoting the development of the socialist market economy. 188. Nesse contexto, como destaca o Documento de Trabalho Europeu, [t]he leading role in the economy assigned to the state-owned sector is further elaborated in the remainder of that law, as well as in a series of other legal instruments, for instance the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission ('SASAC') regulation and various guiding opinions [..]. Moreover, this legal framework also sets out the tight grip of the State and the CCP over SOEs [...]. 189. A relevância das empresas estatais no setor siderúrgico, por ser considerado estratégico, é patente: According to the most recent information available as of writing of this Report, the split between SOEs and privately owned companies is estimated to be almost even in the Chinese steel sector - 60% private and 40% SOEs both in terms of production, as well as capacity [nota de rodapé omitida]. Six Chinese steel producers (four of which are SOEs) are ranked in the top 10 of the world's largest steel producers [nota de rodapé omitida]. This shows that the Chinese steel market is characterized by significant presence of large SOEs. In addition, there is also a significant presence of SOEs in the mining industry, which provides key raw materials for steel production [nota de rodapé omitida]. For example, large steelmaking SOEs like Anshan Iron & Steel Group Corporation and Benxi Steel, also own iron ore mines [nota de rodapé omitida]. When it comes to the performance and efficiency of the steel SOEs, according to an OECD study [nota de rodapé omitida], Chinese steel SOEs tend to exhibit poorer financial performance compared to privately-owned enterprises ('POEs'). At the same time, Chinese SOEs received more subsidies per metric tonne compared to their private counterparts. Amongst SOEs, larger enterprises tend to receive more subsidies compared to smaller ones. This illustrates the consolidation efforts of the Chinese authorities and demonstrates that the Government is favouring larger SOEs in order to create world-class steel conglomerates [...]. SOEs were also more likely than POEs to leverage important subsidy amounts to create new capacity. Subsidisation therefore led to an increase of the Chinese steelmaking capacity and only aggravated the already significant overcapacity problem. 190. Nesse contexto, como atestado no Documento de Trabalho Europeu, "[w]ith the high level of government intervention in the steel industry and a high share of SOEs in the sector, even privately-owned steel producers are prevented from operating under market conditions." 191. Cabe notar que a própria associação industrial representativa da indústria siderúrgica, a Chinese Iron and Steel Association (CISA) está diretamente relacionada ao Estado chinês, de acordo com seu próprio estatuto: According to Article 3 of the AoA, CISA "adheres to the overall leadership of the Communist Party of China. In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, it establishes an organization of the Communist Party of China, carries out Party activities and provides necessary conditions for the activities of the Party organization." 192. Os objetivos estabelecidos pelo Estado para o setor siderúrgico são amplos e atestam a clara intervenção governamental no setor: The thrust of the transformation of the Chinese steel industry as set out in the policy documents is in fact a straightforward one, characterized by the objectives to optimize the industrial structure, as well as to concentrate and upgrade the steel industry. This can be seen from the following excerpts of the Steel Industry Development GO [nota de rodapé omitida]: Optimize production capacity control policies, deepen the reform of factor allocation, strictly implement capacity replacement and prohibit any new increase of steel production capacity. Support the best ones and eliminate the weak ones, encourage cross-regional and cross-ownership mergers and reorganizations and increase industry concentration. [...] Punish any unauthorised new increase of production capacity [...] Strictly implement laws and regulations on environmental protection, energy consumption, [...] so as to eliminate outdated production capacity and strictly prevent the resurgence of substandard steel and overcapacity. In this respect, the Plan lists measures to make leading enterprises "bigger and stronger", while the Steel Industry Development GO expressly seeks "[t]o promote corporate mergers and reorganization, [...] encourage leading enterprises to implement mergers and reorganization and build a number of world-class super-large iron and steel groups". In the same vein, the 2023 Work Plan on the Stable Growth of the Steel Industry aims at "encourag[ing] industry-leading enterprises to implement mergers and acquisitions, build[ing] world-class super-large iron and steel enterprise groups, and foster[ing] the optimal layout of national iron and steel production capacity. Support[ing] specialized enterprises with leading power in particular steel market segments to further integrate resources and create a steel industry ecosystem". To reach the goal the authorities are intent on removing obstacles to trans-regional mergers and reorganisation and encouraging financial institutions to provide comprehensive financial services for enterprises that have implemented mergers and reorganisation, as well as transformation and upgrading. In other words, it can be observed from the relevant planning and policy document that the objective of the Chinese authorities is to create more concentrated and stronger steel industry with leading enterprises even better able to compete internationally. 193. Ademais, o governo busca garantir o acesso aos recursos necessários para a indústria siderúrgica: To improve the comprehensive utilization of resources, well-placed regions will be encouraged to establish industrial parks for the coupling of the raw materials industry, so as to realize the cascading use of energy and resources. Notably, the Plan maintains that "the mechanism for determining resource prices will also be improved" [nota de rodapé emitida], clearly indicating that such price formation is not to be completely market based. 194. Mais ainda, como é comum no planejamento estatal chinês, as diretrizes estabelecidas pelo governo central são replicadas e complementadas a nível regional, sempre seguindo as diretrizes estabelecidas pelo primeiro, não sendo diferente no que diz respeito ao 14º Plano Quinquenal: The overarching goals and objectives for the 14th FYP period, set by the central level plans described above, are translated into more specific goals by various provincial plans. Listed below are three examples of provincial level plans for Shandong, Jiangsu and Hebei. These provinces were selected, as they represent main steel producing provinces in China [nota de rodapé omitida]. The 14th FYP (2021-25) on Developing Steel Industry in Shandong Province (the '14th Shandong FYP on Steel') [nota de rodapé omitida] commits the province to "strive to build a steel industry ecology, further optimize the steel industry's layout, further adjust its structure, further consolidate its foundation and further extend its industry chain, and deepen further the integration of the steel industry with the equipment manufacturing industry so as to double the output value of steel and its related products to trillion-scale" [nota de rodapé omitida] during the period of the plan's validity. In that regard, the main development objectives in the 14th Shandong FYP on Steel include: The second example, Jiangsu Work Plan for Layout Optimization in the Transformation and Upgrading of the Steel Industry Throughout the Province (the 'Jiangsu Steel Industry Work Plan') [nota de rodapé omitida], was released by the Government of Jiangsu in 2019. With Jiangsu being China's second biggest steel producing province, the Jiangsu Steel Industry Work Plan was issued well before the 14th Raw Materials FYP. Therefore, the Jiangsu Steel Industry Work Plan formally does not implement the 14th Raw Materials FYP but is rather inspired by the 19th CCP Congress [nota de rodapé omitida] and President Xi's speech on the development of the Yangtze River economic belt and it implements the Notice of General Office of Provincial Party Committee and General Office of Provincial Government on Issuing the Implementation Opinions on Accelerating the Transformation, Upgrading and High-quality Development of Province's Chemical, Iron, Steel, Coal and Power Industry (document no 2018/32) [nota de rodapé omitida]. [...] To attain these objectives, all relevant departments in the province are required to "study and introduce more supportive policies in terms of capital, taxation, finance, land, personnel resettlement and debt disposal" [nota de rodapé omitida]. Finally, the third example examined here is the Three-Year Action Plan for Cluster Development of Steel Industry Chain in Hebei Province ('Hebei Three-Year Action Plan') [nota de rodapé omitida], the province with the largest steel production in China. This plan was adopted for the period 2020-2022, before the start of the 14th planning cycle, but reflects the same objectives found in the central-level 14th FYPs. [...] Measures foreseen to ensure attaining these goals included: • preferential tax policies (e.g. for company merger and reorganisation, for industrial surplus power generation, for comprehensive utilisation of resources, as well as pre-tax deduction of R&D costs, and export refunds), • active provision of credit support, • adjusting the land use and urban and rural planning to support the relocation, transformation and development of urban enterprises, • improving and supervising incentive mechanisms in order to promote differentiated electricity pricing, water pricing and production outage and limitation policies to encourage enterprises to move towards green, smart, high-end production. While the research has not revealed specific information to show to what extent the objectives spelled out in the Hebei Three-Year Action Plan have been reached by the end of 2022, what matters in the context of this Report are the interventions by the various levels of government in the economy, shaping all relevant aspects of the steel sector in the province. The above clearly shows that the goals and objectives of provincial-level planning are closely aligned with the objectives of central-level plans for the 14th FYP period even though in the case of Jiangsu and Hebei provinces, their Work Plan and Action Plan were released already during 13th planning cycle. The plans describe in detail the development objectives the steel industry should follow, most importantly in terms of capacity and layout optimization. All this evidence points to the existence of a high degree of government intervention into the sector. The provisions of these provincial plans are an example of the extremely limited space left to the market to shape the steel sector. 195. Cabe notar que as empresas mencionadas a seguir, produtoras/exportadoras dos tubos objeto da investigação, se situam especificamente nas províncias acima referenciadas: Shengli Oil & Gas Pipe Holdings (Shandong), Jiangsu Yulong Steel Pipe Co., Ltd. (Jiangsu), Julong Steel Pipe Co., Ltd. (Hebei) e Yiping Pipeline Equipment Co., Ltd. (Hebei). 196. Ainda, da mesma forma que já analisado anteriormente em relação ao setor industrial em geral, há intervenção estatal na economia a fim de garantir o suprimento de matérias primas no setor siderúrgico: [...] the Government has consistently implemented numerous export restrictions on a broad range of raw materials, having a distortive effect on the market [nota de rodapé omitida]. These export restrictions have also affected several key raw materials in steelmaking [nota de rodapé omitida]. The restrictions have taken the form of non-automatic export licensing requirements and export duties. The following examples illustrate the export restrictions that China has imposed on steelmaking raw materials in recent years [nota de rodapé omitida]: • export licensing requirements (non-automatic licensing) for coke, coking coal, manganese, chromium, molybdenum, silicon and vanadium; • export taxes on export of metal waste and scrap, nickel, pig iron, tin, tungsten and zinc. These measures, which have spanned over many years, confirm the persistent government intervention with respect to raw materials for steelmaking. 197. Nesse sentido, como mencionado no Documento de Trabalho Europeu, According to the OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials, between 2020 and 2022, China applied export taxes (export duties), export quotas and non-automatic export licensing requirements as export restricting measures on some goods. This list is not exhaustive. As a result, producers in China can often purchase raw materials cheaper than foreign competitors. This provides them with a strong competitive advantage with regard to both prices and availability [nota de rodapé omitida]. 198. Em resumo, portanto, a economia chinesa é dominada pela propriedade e controle estatal, com o Estado, intrinsecamente conectado ao Partido Comunista Chinês, atuando por mecanismos diversos na garantia de que seus objetivos políticos e econômicos sejam atingidos: In practice, the socialist market economy system has meant that while market forces have been mobilised to some degree, the decisive role of the State remains intact, with tight interconnections between government and enterprises. The basic features of the socialist market economy are dominant state-ownership, an extensive and sophisticated economic planning system, as well as interventionist industrial policies and a broad array of other tools to pursue political and economic objectives set by the Party and/or the Government. This system does not prioritise and often does not result in market-based resource allocations. Indeed, the concept of socialist market economy prioritises other objectives - such as 'socialist modernization'. "Giving play to decisive role of market forces", a phrase often found in Chinese policy documents, remains only an incidental means for achieving those objectives, with the market forces tolerated where suitable rather than being considered the main organising principle of the national economy. 199. Mais ainda, tal controle é amplo e profundo no setor siderúrgico, incluindo o produto sob análise, como bem resumido no Documento de Trabalho Europeu: The steel industry is regarded as a key/pillar industry by the government. This is confirmed in numerous plans, directives and other documents focused on steel, which are issued at national, regional and municipal level. The government guides the development of the sector in accordance with a broad range of policy tools and directives related, inter alia, to market composition and restructuring, raw materials, investment, capacity elimination, product range, relocation, upgrading etc. Through these and other means, the government directs and controls virtually every aspect in the development and functioning of the sector [...]. For the last several decades Chinese policies have been to support the rise of 'national champions' in the steel industry. To accomplish this, the Chinese authorities have employed an elaborate set of financial and other subsidies for the sector and engineered strategic mergers that consolidated the industry players. In this respect, SOEs are a key instrument through which the government continues to develop the steel sector, not least by promoting the creation of ever-larger steel producers. This is achieved through policies intended to shape the structure of the market, e.g. through mergers and regulation of market access. In addition, Chinese financial institutions play a key role in implementing the government's policies in the steel sector. They provide access to finance following the government's direction and implementing the government's policy objectives [...]. These elements combined present a picture of a sector heavily influenced by the government. In this regard, numerous trade defence investigations in various jurisdictions have confirmed that Chinese steel producers benefit from a wide array of State support measures and other market distortive practices such as export restrictions affecting raw materials and inputs [...]. The overarching control of the government prevents free market forces from prevailing in the steel sector in China. The problem of overcapacity is arguably the clearest illustration of the implications of the government's policies and the distortions resulting therefrom. Overcapacity built up by China over years triggered a surge of low-priced Chinese exports causing a depression of steel prices globally and having a negative impact on, inter alia, the financial situation of steel producers worldwide. While the government has committed to addressing the overcapacity problem, in particular through the 14th Raw Materials FYP and the Steel Industry Development GO, it remains to be seen whether this and other targets for the sector are successfully met, given in particular that (i) during the 14th planning cycle, the declared objectives for the steel sector appear contradictory as far as overcapacity reduction is concerned [nota de rodapé omitida] and (ii) following China's departure from GFSEC, it became very difficult to get any accurate information related to the reduction of overcapacity in China [...]. 200. Outro documento que reitera as conclusões acima apresentadas é aquele elaborado pela Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico (OCDE/OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), denominado "State Enterprises in the Steel Sector" (vide documento "State_enterprises_steel_sector" no presente anexo). 201. É importante registrar que o documento da OCDE esclarece que, para seus propósitos, o conceito de empresa estatal está relacionado a um [...] significant link to the state. A 'significant' link' is defined as any ownership link that correspond to 10% or more of a company shares (...) This working definition facilitates the empirical analysis without losing sight of the intricacies related to state influence and state control (...)." 202. Considerando tal definição, o estudo atesta que as 100 maiores empresas siderúrgicas eram empresas estatais, sendo que estas representaram pelo menos 32% da produção global bruta em 2016. 203. Tal estudo complementa, ainda, que: [...] steel is a base industry, often regarded as strategic for economic development. As such, the motivations for the presence of SEs in this sector might be higher than for other industrial sectors. Second, steel is a capital intensive sector, where investments in fixed assets are considerable and are to some extent irreversible thus entailing significant sunk costs. Therefore, any preferential treatment given do SEs may result in over-investment or heighten barriers to exit. Third, steel is an intermediate input into a wide range of international supply chains. Therefore, any effects from the presence of SEs in steel may propagate across several sectors (and economies). Fourth, steel is a tradable good and market distortions easily propagate through international trade in steel [...]." 204. Ainda, o documento WT/TPR/S/415/Rev.1, da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), de março de 2022, que trata do exame de políticas comerciais da China, informa que não houve mudanças na legislação que trata de controle de preços: 3.3.4.2 Price controls 3.190. There were no changes to the legislation concerning price controls during the review period. Article 18 of the Price Law163 authorizes the competent authorities to carry out, when necessary, price controls over: (i) products that have a significant bearing on the national economy and people's livelihoods; (ii) a limited number of rare products; (iii) products of natural monopoly; (iv) key public utilities; and (v) key public services. Laws and regulations on specific industrial/service sectors may also contain provisions on price administration that reaffirm that relevant business operators or service providers should follow the principles and rules set out by the Price Law. These laws and regulations include, inter alia, the Pharmaceutical Administration Law, the Railway Law, the Postal Law, the Compulsory Education Law, the Notary Law, the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Administration of Judicial Authentication, the Civil Aviation Law, and the Commercial Bank Law. Laws and regulations related to price controls are summarized in Table 3.20. 3.191. Price controls take two forms: "government-set prices" or "government-guided prices". Government-set prices are fixed prices set by the competent authorities, while government-guided prices are prices set by business operators within a range of prices set by the competent pricing departments or other related government departments, within which the real price is allowed to fluctuate. The determination of government-set prices or government-guided prices varies according to the type of product or service. Consideration is usually given to the market situation and average social costs, as well as economic, regional, and seasonal factors, and development and social needs. 205. Quanto à propriedade das empresas, o documento em questão afirma: 3.199 In China's economy, state ownership of companies is importante and coexists with diverse forms of private ownership. State participation varies from wholly SOEs and majority state ownership to the State acting as another shareholder. [...] 3.202. The State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration (SASAC) is in charge of contributing capital to, and appointing top managers in SOEs under its management. It acts as a representative of the Government and is directly subordinated to the State Concil. [...] 3.203. The legal status of SOEs varies from fully Government-owned entities to stock companies with the State or states agencies as the dominant stockholder. Hence, many large and formally private companies that may even be traded on the stock market have the State as an importante of major shareholder (...). 206. Além da conhecida influência do estado, através de mecanismos complexos e pouco transparentes, é importante considerar: 4.92. China is the world's largest producer of industrial goods. In 2018, with a total value-added amounting to some USD 4 trillion, the Chinese manufacturing sector accounted for 28% of global manufacturing output. [nota de rodapé omitida]. The sector is an important driver of China's economy. [...] 4.94. A number of policy initiatives remain in force to address the challenges facing manufacturing activities and further develop the sector. 207. Enfim, os diversos estudos citados e analisados neste documento corroboram o entendimento exposto no Relatório Final quanto à forte intervenção do governo chinês no setor siderúrgico daquele país. 208. Desta forma, o citado Relatório Final registra, em suas conclusões finais, que os países atuantes na área de defesa comercial (União Europeia, Estados Unidos, México, Canadá, Índia e Austrália) atestam que no setor siderúrgico chinês não prevalecem condições de mercado. Portanto, a metodologia adotada por esses países não se baseia nos preços e custos domésticos da China, quando do cálculo do valor normal para empresas chinesas, concluindo que: desta forma, o presente estudo demostra, claramente, que a China deve continuar a ser tratada como um país cuja economia, como um todo, mas no setor siderúrgico em particular, não prevalecem as condições de mercado necessárias para que se possa fazer uso, em processos antidumping, de custo e preços domésticos das empresas locais! 209. Em síntese, a peticionária afirmou que a análise dos diversos elementos de prova apresentados demonstra que na China, em decorrência da forte interferência do governo, que assume inúmeras formas, preços e custos na cadeia de produção do produto objeto da investigação não são formados em condições de economia de mercado, razão pela qual os preços e custos das empresas investigadas chinesas não poderiam ser utilizados com vistas à apuração de valor normal. 4.1.1.3. Da análise do DECOM sobre o tratamento do setor produtivo de tubos soldados na China para apuração do valor normal na determinação do dumping para fins de início da investigação 210. Ressalta-se, inicialmente, que o objetivo desta análise não é apresentar um entendimento amplo a respeito do status da China como uma economia predominantemente de mercado ou não. Trata-se de decisão sobre utilização de metodologia de apuração da margem de dumping que não se baseie em uma comparação estrita com os preços ou os custos domésticos chineses, estritamente no âmbito desta investigação. 211. Cabe destacar que a complexa análise acerca da prevalência de condições de economia de mercado no segmento produtivo chinês objeto da investigação possui lastro no próprio Protocolo de Acessão da China à OMC. Com a expiração do item 15(a)(ii) do referido Protocolo, o tratamento automático de não economia de mercado antes conferido aos produtores/exportadores chineses investigados cessou. Desde então, em cada caso concreto, é necessário que as partes interessadas apresentem elementos suficientes, nos termos do restante do item 15(a), para avaliar, na determinação de comparabilidade de preços, se: (i) serão utilizados os preços e os custos chineses correspondentes ao segmento produtivo objeto da investigação; ou (ii) será adotada uma metodologia alternativa que não se baseie em uma comparação estrita com os preços ou os custos domésticos chineses. 212. Para alcançar uma conclusão a respeito da prevalência ou não de condições de mercado no segmento produtivo chinês de tubos soldados no âmbito deste processo, levou-se em consideração todo o conjunto de elementos probatórios trazidos pela peticionária, incluindo o documento "Análise da economia chinesa no setor de tubos de aço com costura" e os estudos nele referenciados. Adicionalmente, consideraram-se outras evidências que basearam decisões anteriores da autoridade investigadora a respeito do tema e avaliou-se se esse conjunto constituiria indício suficientemente esclarecedor para formar a convicção da autoridade investigadora para fins de início da investigação. 213. A conclusão deste documento parte dos seguintes fatos, os quais foram comprovados por meio das evidências analisadas nos documentos apresentados pela peticionária: (i) contribuição decisiva da China para o excesso de capacidade de aço no mundo, com empresas chinesas possuindo lucratividade média mais baixa e endividamento maior do que suas congêneres no exterior - indicadores ainda piores no caso de empresas estatais; (ii) alta presença e alto nível de intervenção governamental, direto ou indireto, em todos os níveis de governo (central, provincial e municipal), com influência significativa inclusive sobre as empresas privadas, conforme demonstrado nos estudos de caso referentes às empresas Baowu/Baosteel, Tianjing Pipe Corporation (TPCO), Baoji Petroleum Steel Pipe Co., Ltd. e Julong Steel Pipe Co., Ltd. (JLSP) (relacionadas à China National Petroleum Corporation - CNPC), Shashi Steel Pipe Factory (SSPW) (relacionada à Sinopec) e Zhejiang Kingland & Pipeline Technologies Co.,Ltd./Shagang Group; e (iii) avaliação de que o setor siderúrgico, segmento produtivo dos tubos soldados, é considerado estratégico pelo governo chinês, sujeito a planos quinquenais, diretrizes específicas e metas de consolidação e controle estatal. 214. Antes de empreender a avaliação per se dos elementos probatórios submetidos pela peticionária, que será apresentada nos itens a seguir, alguns aspectos são dignos de ponderação. 215. Tenha-se presente, em primeiro lugar, que a análise realizada não se refere simplesmente à existência de planos, políticas e programas governamentais. A condução de políticas industriais e a existência de políticas públicas em si não é suficiente para caracterizar a não prevalência de condições de economia de mercado. A análise em comento tem por objeto a avaliação dos tipos de intervenção e, principalmente, o seu impacto no domínio econômico fruto da ação do Estado naquele segmento produtivo específico. Não obstante, o estudo de planos, políticas e programas governamentais faz-se relevante, tendo em conta que as ações e sua forma de implementação podem estar expressas nas disposições de tais documentos oficiais. 216. A análise aqui exarada difere daquela realizada no âmbito de investigações de subsídios acionáveis com vistas à adoção de medidas compensatórias e de análises de situação particular de mercado previstas no Artigo 2.2 do Acordo Antidumping, pois a base legal é, mais uma vez, neste caso em específico, o próprio Protocolo de Acessão da China à OMC. Nesse sentido, não há que se aprofundar sobre aspectos relativos exclusivamente a investigações de subsídios, como a determinação de especificidade e o montante exato de subsídios acionáveis eventualmente recebidos por empresas do setor, pois não se pretende aqui quantificar a magnitude das distorções existentes de maneira exata. 217. Todavia, em ambiente em que as políticas estatais distorcem significativamente o mercado, mesmo agentes privados que aparentemente seguiriam lógica de mercado acabam tendo sua atuação afetada pela influência dessas políticas. Conforme demonstrado nos estudos de caso do Relatório Final, empresas como a Shagang Group - que se autodenomina a maior siderúrgica privada da China - possuem participação acionária relevante do Estado (por meio da SASAC provincial) e de organizações controladas pelo Partido Comunista Chinês, além de declararem explicitamente sua subordinação às políticas estatais para o setor. 218. Ademais, distorções mercadológicas não apenas podem ser fruto de políticas estatais, mas também podem ser acentuadas pela participação relevante de empresas estatais no setor, que de alguma maneira podem interferir na concorrência entre empresas e na rationale do mercado do segmento analisado. 219. O nível de distorções provocado pelo envolvimento governamental pode, dessa forma, ser relevante para conclusão em um caso concreto, caso os elementos apresentados constituam indícios suficientemente esclarecedores de que tais distorções muito provavelmente impactariam, de forma não desprezível, a alocação de fatores econômicos que de outra forma ocorreria se não houvesse tais intervenções. 220. Como já reconhecido pela jurisprudência da OMC em matéria de subsídios (AB Report - US - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, paras. 446-447), a existência de distorções significativas decorrentes da presença predominante do governo no mercado poderá justificar a não utilização de preços privados daquele como benchmark apropriado para fins de apuração do montante de subsídios. 221. Assim, a variedade e o nível de subsidiação, em conjunto com outras formas de intervenção governamental, poderão resultar em tamanho grau de distorção dos incentivos que, no limite, podem acabar fazendo com que deixem de prevalecer condições de economia de mercado em determinado segmento produtivo. 222. Ressalte-se que, desde 2019, foram concluídas pelo DECOM investigações que versaram sobre a não prevalência de condições de economia de mercado no segmento produtivo de aço na China. Cabe ressaltar as seguintes investigações: aço GNO (Portaria SECINT nº 495, de 2019); tubos de aço inoxidável austenítico com costura (Portaria SECINT nº 506, de 2019); laminados planos de aço inoxidável a frio (Portaria SECINT nº 4.353, de 2019); cilindros para GNV (Resolução GECEX nº 225, de 2021); tubos de aço carbono (Resolução GECEX nº 497, de 21 de julho de 2023); laminados planos a frio (Resolução CAMEX nº 854, de 12 de fevereiro 2026); e laminados planos revestidos (Resolução CAMEX nº 856, de 13 de fevereiro de 2026). Esses precedentes, embora não vinculem a presente investigação, demonstram o entendimento reiterado da autoridade investigadora acerca das distorções estruturais do setor siderúrgico chinês. 223. Das análises prévias do DECOM, importa destacar que as conclusões alcançadas pelo Departamento acerca da não prevalência de condições de economia de mercado no setor siderúrgico chinês no âmbito das investigações e revisões citadas no parágrafo anterior não devem ser interpretadas de forma ampla, produzindo efeitos tão somente no escopo daqueles processos. Desse modo, na presente investigação, coube à peticionária apresentar todos os elementos pertinentes nos autos deste processo para a devida análise. 224. Não obstante a independência de cada investigação, conclui-se que o entendimento anteriormente adotado pelo Departamento no âmbito dos referidos procedimentos no segmento produtivo de aço na China se mostra corroborado pelos novos elementos de prova apresentados pela peticionária, em especial o "Documento de Trabalho Europeu de 2024", que atualiza e confirma as conclusões do documento de 2017 (Comission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People's Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defense Investigations), ratificando que o controle abrangente do governo chinês sobre o setor siderúrgico impede a prevalência de forças de livre mercado.